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In a recent paper a set of differential equations was proposed to describe
a social process, where pairs of partners emerge in a community. The
choice was performed on a basis of attractive resources and of random
initial preferences. An efficiency of the process, defined as the probability
of finding a partner, was found to depend on the community size. Here we
demonstrate, that if the resources are not relevant, the efficiency is equal
to unity; everybody finds a partner. With this new formulation, about 80
percent of community members enter into dyads; the remaining 20 percent
form triads.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Ge;
1. Introduction
Sociophysics is a branch of the statistical and computational physics.
It can be defined as an attempt to apply tools of theoretical physics to the
social sciences. The problem, if and to which extent it is possible/allowed to
describe social processes mathematically, cannot by resolved a priori. The
arguments for the negative answer are well known in sociology, as they are
used in the discussion between the empirical and the theoretical traditions
[1]. As these arguments are continuously developed during about 200 recent
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years, it seems possible that still the subject is not closed. As for the physi-
cists, however, mathematics is at least not worse than any other language;
then the discussion is empty. Last but not least, the empirical tradition
embraces a good part of sociology. In this field, however, it is natural to
treat the physicists as outsiders, who ”reinvent existing tools and rediscover
established empirical results” [2, 3], and who eventually will be integrated
into the larger social network community. We imagine that as for the soci-
ological perspective, these notions could be applied to the sociophysics as a
whole. Feeling offended or not, we are not willing to defy the integration.
The problem to be discussed here can be strictly formulated as a set of
abstract differential equations, but its social interpretation is maybe more
appealing. The term we use: ”pair formation” means that a set ofN objects,
initially random, transforms in time towards a stable state with some pairs
of objects. If no object remains unpaired, the efficiency of the process is 100
percent or 1.0. A fraction of unity means that some objects are not paired,
i.e. the process is less efficient. The most straightforward equivalent of the
process is when pairs of sexual partners appear in a group of young people.
However, as we are going to demonstrate, the mathematics involved does
not contain an assumption on individual differences, as for example sex.
Up to our knowledge, the problem of social pairing was discussed in
Refs. [4, 5]. The subject of these papers is some kind of social optimization:
the task is to find a partner with best parameters. There, the evaluation of
these parameters can take into account individual needs. This algorithmic
approach is well established in the literature of the subject [6, 7]. Our
starting point is maybe different, as we base on an assumption that final
equilibrium state is developed as a result of initial preferences which are
random. In this picture, the preferences are first followed, then rationalized
ex-post. We note that this point of view was explored recently in a model
of random sexual contacts [8]. As it was formulated by Vilfredo Pareto,
people do what they believe is desirable for them [9].
In our previous paper [10], an attempt was made to evaluate the effi-
ciency of the pairing process as dependent on the size 2N of the whole group
(this variable was termed N in [10]). The difference between Ref. [10] and
the present work is in the details of the model equations; in words, it can be
summarized as follows. The core of the pairing process is that each group
member selects another one based on the recources of the selected member
and on her/his willingness to share them. Further, the willingness of the
selecting member to share her/his own resources is reoriented in time as
to give most resources to the most generous member, just selected. This
can be seen as an application of the concept of reciprocity, well established
in social sciences [11, 12, 13]. In this way, a positive feedback appears be-
tween particular members and weak initial inclinations are transformed into
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a monopoly on mutual feeding. Those who do not reorient quickly enough,
because their initial inclinations were ill-directed or too distributed - fail and
remain unpaired. This version of the model has been presented in Ref. [10].
The velocity α of reorientation was another parameter, and the efficiency
was investigated as dependent on α and N .
Within the above given terms, the goal of this work can be presented as
follows. We already know that an individual selection is based on two agents:
resources of the selected partner and her/his willingness to share them with
the selecting member. Now, let us eliminate the criterion of resources, with
only the one of willingness left. In other words, it does not matter any more
if a member has anything to offer; the only relevant question is to whom
she/he wants to offer what she/he has. Then, a striking effect is observed:
the efficiency of the pairing process becomes equal to unity. No unpaired
members is left.
The model equations are given in the next section, together with some
example of the obtained plots. Last section contains our conclusion, aimed
as sociological - in the physical sense.
2. Model and its results
The resources of i-th unit is defined as p(i) ≥ 0. It evolves according to
the following rule.
dp(i)
dt
= N2 − [
N∑
i=1
p(i)]2 −
N∑
j 6=i
[r(j, i)p(j) − r(i, j)p(i)] (1)
where t is time and r(i, j) is what i-th unit indends to offer to j-th one.
The matrix r(i, j) also evolves; in the model version presented in Ref. [10]
it was evolving according to the following rule:
dr(i, j)
dt
= α
(
r(j, i)p(j) −
∑
k r(k, i)p(k)
N − 1
)
(2)
whereas in the present work the latter equation is limited to
dr(i, j)
dt
= α
(
r(j, i) −
∑
k r(k, i)
N − 1
)
(3)
As we see, in the previous model the matrix r(i, j) (willingness matrix)
evolves in time as dependent on the resources p(i). In the second formulation
this dependence is removed.
In Fig. 1 we present an example of the results for small value of α. In the
former version of the model [10], the efficiency of the process for this value
of α was about 0.2. With the application of Eq.3, the efficiency is equal
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Fig. 1. The amount of resources as dependent on time for N=10 and α=0.2.
to 1.0 (100 percent) for all of our numerical evidence. As in the previous
model, the paired units get the same amounts of resources.
Surprisingly, a pair is not the only pattern which appears as the result
of the simulation. We observe also triads of two different types; let us call
them type 1 and 2. In the stable state of triad 1, one of contributing units
exchanges resources symmetrically with the remaining two, while these two
do not interact with each other. As a consequence, the amount of resources
of one unit is twice larger than the amounts of the others. In triad 2, each of
three units exchanges her/his resources with the others; then, their amounts
of resources are equal. These triads are presented schematically in Fig. 2,
together with the pair. We checked that the probability that an unit enters
to a triad is about 0.2, and this result seemingly does not depend on the
parameters N and α. Small numerical evidence suggests that groups larger
than triads can be stable as well, but they are rare.
3. Conclusion
Summarizing, we report a new strategy of searching a partner to ex-
change resources. Our new element is to disregard the actual amount of
resources of a potential partner, and to take into account only her/his will-
ingness to offer them. Although this strategy is obviously far from being
optimal with respect of acquired amount of resources, its advantage is that
everybody is fed with some resources in the final state. This is the main
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Fig. 2. The scheme of a pair and two kinds of triads.
goal of this paper.
The results of the model seem to present a nontrivial alternative for
what is considered as normal behaviour in biology. Sexual rivalization and
competition of genes - these ideas entered into common knowledge. The
price we pay - we, living creatures - is that some less perfect units cannot
pass their genetic material to an offspring. In the competitive world and
in a closed group, they just are not able to find partners, tolerant to their
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weaknesses. Although in human world all that can be changed at least in
principle, the literature and other media provide a large pile of descriptions
of this situation.
Would it then be of interest to modify our sexual behaviour? Truly,
we do it already. As it is described by evolutionary psychologists, once
the aim is not an offspring but just sex, our demands decrease [14]. This
behaviour means that our sexual needs are alienated from their biological
basis. Then, they can be used for other purposes: political, economic, social
or just entertainment. This is one of differences between animals and people.
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